
A Different Market, Not a More Knowable One
In 1960, the S&P 500 was dominated by 425 industrial companies, 25 railroads, and 50 utilities. Today’s index spreads across industrials, financials, information technology, health care, consumer discretionary and staples, utilities, real estate, materials, energy, and communication services. The index is more concentrated at the top — a small number of giant companies now account for an outsized share of total market value — but the underlying business mix is far more varied than it used to be. A market can be both things simultaneously: broader in composition and narrower in leadership. That duality is itself a lesson in why single-number comparisons across eras can mislead.
It also explains why stacking today’s price-to-earnings ratio against the one from 1960, or 1980, or 2000 tells you less than it seems to. Valuation multiples are partly a reflection of what kind of companies make up the market. An index weighted toward capital-intensive railroads and utilities does not carry the same "fair" multiple as one weighted toward asset-light technology and services firms. None of this means historical valuation comparisons are worthless — they still carry information about sentiment and extremes — but they need the context of what, exactly, is being valued before they can be read as a signal about the future.
The Cost of Investing Has Collapsed
The more measurable change is cost, and here the historical record is unambiguous in direction, if not in exact magnitude for every investor. In earlier decades, an individual buying or selling shares in small lots could face brokerage costs of 2% or more per trade, with institutional costs often exceeding 1%. Mutual funds — for most households, the only practical route to a diversified portfolio — typically carried upfront sales loads of 5% to 8%, on top of annual management fees of 0.5% to 2%. Vanguard’s first index fund, now seen as the prototype of low-cost investing, launched with an 8.5% sales load.
Trading mechanics added a quieter cost. Before 1997, stocks traded in increments of an eighth of a dollar — a 12.5-cent spread. A stock closing at a $1 bid could be bought the next day at a $1.125 ask, producing what looked like a 12.5% gain that was really just the cost of crossing the spread. In markets with wide spreads and thin liquidity, that "bid-ask bounce" could distort measured returns in ways that had nothing to do with the underlying business. Penny-wide spreads in today’s most-traded stocks make that distortion largely immaterial for them, though it still matters more in less liquid corners of the market.
Taxes compound the picture. One estimate suggests federal taxes alone could have trimmed a headline long-term annualized stock return of just over 10% down to roughly 7%, and that figure excludes state and local taxes. Tax rates today are generally lower, but rates are policy choices, not physical constants — they can rise again.
Put these pieces together and a clear pattern emerges: it has become structurally cheaper to hold a diversified stock portfolio. That is a real, durable improvement in investors’ net experience. It is not the same as a claim that future net returns will be high — gross market returns could still come in lower than history, and a smaller cost drag on a smaller return is not automatically a good outcome in absolute terms.
| Market feature | Then (roughly pre-1990s) | Now | What it means for investors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trading costs | Often 1–2%+ per trade | A small fraction of a percent | Lower friction, not higher certainty |
| Fund costs | 5–8% sales loads plus 0.5–2% annual fees | Often near zero for index funds | Index funds are built to track the market, not beat it |
| Price increments / spreads | 1/8-dollar ticks; spreads could add or subtract several percent | Penny or sub-penny increments | Historical "returns" partly reflected trading mechanics |
| Disclosure rules | Selective disclosure allowed before 2000 | Regulation FD requires simultaneous disclosure | A narrower, but not eliminated, informational edge |
| Tax drag | Could cut long-run annualized returns by several points | Generally lower, but policy-dependent | Today’s advantage isn’t guaranteed to persist |
Cheaper Access Did Not Retire Overconfidence
The disclosure change deserves its own note. Before the SEC’s Regulation FD took effect in 2000, companies could share material information with select investors before telling everyone else. Requiring simultaneous disclosure to all investors closed one specific channel of advantage — the kind that let sophisticated, well-connected investors act on information before the public could. That is a meaningful structural shift, and it likely helps explain why fewer investors have managed to post the kind of long, dominant outperformance streaks that defined earlier market eras. But a narrower channel for one type of edge is not the same as a level field in every respect. Skill in analysis, patience, and risk management were never solely about who heard the news first, and differences in those areas have not vanished just because disclosure rules improved.
The deeper point sits underneath all of this: more information does not automatically translate into better forecasts. The investor who devours decades of bond-default data or sector histories understands the past more thoroughly — a genuine edge in itself — but understanding what happened is different from knowing what happens next. Markets reward that distinction constantly, usually at the expense of whoever forgets it.
Separating What Improved From What Didn’t
None of this is an argument for pessimism, nor for abandoning historical context altogether. It’s an argument for precision about what, specifically, has gotten better: the cost of participating, the breadth of sector exposure, and the fairness of information access. None of those improvements tell you what next year’s returns will be, whether today’s valuations are "cheap" or "expensive" in some timeless sense, or whether a skilled active manager can still find an edge somewhere in the market’s remaining inefficiencies. Markets have genuinely changed. The need for humility about what comes next has not.


